For example, when considering the lift needed to deploy and support 100,000 soldiers anywhere in the world, a 1979 GAO report cites an Army requirement of at least 172 watercraft to sustain a force of 100,000 soldiers for global deployment. World War II may have represented the apex of Army watercraft, but those vessels (and units) were also critical for the Cold War. Over the course of World War II, the United States operated over 111,000 ships and watercraft supporting the movement of material and personnel to sustain the overall war effort. If history is our guide, the current watercraft fleet is anemic for effective competition - much less combat. The question of how many watercraft might be needed for a war can be informed by history. Army operates 120 vessels, with a plan to reduce its fleet to 74 craft by the fiscal year 2027. Yet despite a clear strategic need for these craft, the U.S. logistics support vessels is one way to mitigate these risks. Expanding the number while decreasing the size of U.S. Their size makes them relatively easy targets at sea or in port, and they are required to operate at functioning ports for onload or offload - a risky bet in a highly contested theater. These large craft, previously used to build ‘iron mountains’ of materiel, will be unsuitable for operating effectively in the Indo-Pacific. military operations have seen steady reliance on just such large, slow, easy-target vessels for logistics supply across the oceans. reliance on a small number of large, slow-moving, easily targeted vessels simplifies targeting and increases the odds of China hitting its desired targets. air and maritime vessels operating in the Western Pacific. The maritime environment will challenge Taiwan’s ability to apply Ukraine’s logistical playbook and complicate America’s ability to provide support to the island.Ĭhoosing to not learn from Russia’s errors means the United States will be ill-equipped to conduct - or support - military operations thousands of miles from main supply bases and in an environment that will be highly contested by a capable and growing Chinese military.Ĭhina’s growing air, naval, and rocket forces are increasingly able to threaten U.S. In such a conflict the U.S., not the Chinese, military is at most risk of replicating Russian logistical failures. These articles are correct in capturing key lessons from a ground war between bordering states in Europe but fail to adequately address the significant logistical implications for a largely maritime conflict in the Western Pacific. They identify concepts and capabilities needed by Taiwan to resist a numerically and technologically superior China and see in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a cautionary tale for Xi Jinping should he harbor similarly militarized ambitions. forces could find themselves without adequate numbers of watercraft or a joint logistics concept that captures the dynamic changes of force design and modernization that each of the services has embarked upon.Īnalysts have sought to apply initial lessons learned from the war in Ukraine to a potential conflict over Taiwan. Though the Army and Marine Corps (via the Navy), each have plans to acquire intra-theater watercraft, without coordination and a significant increase in scale, U.S.
Failure in the Indo-Pacific theater might not be represented by lines of stalled vehicles, but rather troops and equipment far removed from the battle and without adequate intra-theater lift to move them across the ocean. The challenge of logistics in the Pacific theater is different than those associated with land movements across a shared border in Europe. planners, policymakers, and legislators should be the importance of logistics to the successful execution of military operations.
An equally important corollary is Ukraine’s successful targeting of Russian supply operations and its ability to translate these actions into success on the battlefield. The inability of the Russian army to supply or maintain its forces in Ukraine has been well-documented. One of the enduring images from Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine will likely be the convoy parked northeast of Kyiv for weeks, dozens of miles long, unable to bring its combat power to bear with an attack on the capital. Browning bar mark 3 reviews.The U.S military is at risk of repeating Russia’s logistics failures in Ukraine during a war in the Indo-Pacific.
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